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Mr. Peabody’s Improbable Legal Intellectual
History
MARK FENSTER†
INTRODUCTION
You may recall Mr. Peabody, a cartoon dog who had his
own segment on Rocky & His Friends and The Bullwinkle
Show. Mr. Peabody was the smartest being alive, the
enormity of his erudition matched only by that of his ego. He
spent each segment teaching his rather stupid boy Sherman
about history by transporting them both back in time via the
WABAC (pronounced “wayback”) machine he invented. The
histories he walked into are fractured, as per the perverse
logic of Jay Ward studio cartoons of that era, the studio that
also produced Fractured Fairy Tales as a repeating segment
in the same shows. The irrepressible and resourceful Mr.
Peabody typically intervened to preserve history as we
currently understand it from the foolish proclivities of the
presumably great, but in fact flawed, historical figures that
he and Sherman found in the past. Great men only became
great because the great historian Mr. Peabody made them so.
In a pre-postmodern take on the historian’s craft, the cartoon
posited that history does not simply recognize great men—it
transforms commoners into them.1
Although his historical method challenged and even
disrupted historical knowledge, Mr. Peabody did not engage
in the history of ideas; his interest lay entirely in worldhistorical events that he found through his WABAC machine
and that he manipulated to track the historical record. The
foolish, confused, and often cowardly people he found could
not contemplate or fully understand their own place in
history, much less the ideas that surrounded them, while Mr.
† Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Hazouri & Roth Tort Professor, Levin College of Law,
University of Florida. Thanks to Jack Schlegel and Rachel Rebouché for
suggestions.
1. A recent film adaptation revived the same main characters and the
WABAC machine, and relied upon the same general storyline. MR. PEABODY AND
SHERMAN (DreamWorks Animation 2014).
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Peabody was no more interested in intellectual or ideological
context than the audience for his cartoons—even the
audience for cartoons written to humor both children and
adults. But the animated sequences that always introduced
and concluded each Mr. Peabody and Sherman episode offer
a character who I think represents the work of legal
intellectual historians, and especially their relationship to
those lawyers and legal academics who attempt to make
substantive arguments about the present on the backs of the
truncated version of the past that they tell. Herewith, a
description of the opening sequence:
A trumpet sounds; flags introducing a parade appear. Two proud
horses bearing knights in armor and blankets with the word
“PEABODY’S” lead the parade; three identical lumpen Robin Hoodera soldiers on foot follow; then a Cleopatra-like figure borne by
four Egyptian servants on a bed festooned with the word
“IMPROBABLE”; then three goofy African-like savages with
spears; then a solider riding an elephant wearing a blanket with
the word “HISTORY”; then Mr. Peabody and Sherman in a humble
chariot pulled by a fearsome horse; then three lovely maidens
leaping, absurdly pulling the petals off of flowers. Bringing up the
rear is a lone street sweeper who cleans the petals (and, implicitly,
the excrement that the animals must have produced).

Legal intellectual history, I suggest in this Paper, is the
street sweeper in the parade of law’s history and its use of
history. Lawyers and legal academics want great, important
figures, cases, and theories with and against which they can
do battle. The student-edited law reviews prefer bold, clear
claims that explain why one answer to an historical question
presented will bring justice, while a competing answer is
manifestly unjust; why one past approach lacks principle or
created worse consequences; or how one theory or another
can explain all manner of thorny legal issues which bedevils
academics and practitioners. Viewing an appellate decision,
legislative enactment, or academic debate, the legal academic
must travel back in time to set matters straight, redeeming
the past to make certain that the future avoids its confused
and unfortunate fate.
Intellectual historians trail behind the legal academy’s
heavy-breathing and magnificent use of the past, cleaning up
its waste by providing context, complicating narratives, and
replacing bright trumpet horns with muted tones, vivid
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colors with shades of gray. Well after the parade has
dispersed and marchers have moved on, and often before the
next “Big Issue” causes the celebrants to line back up,
intellectual history can bring complexity and context back in
to the frame. I illustrate this dynamic first by describing the
use of legal realism in Brian Tamanaha’s recent monograph
on what he describes as the formalist-realist divide in legal
theories about judging and about legal doctrine, and in the
debate over that divide.2 In Part II, I describe a relatively
minor figure in the pantheon of legal realists (as that
pantheon currently exists), Thurman Arnold, and his realist
critique of the criminal law and procedure.
I. INSIDE THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE
Tamanaha’s central purpose in Beyond the FormalistRealist Divide is to correct the present tendency, which he
traces to Grant Gilmore’s enormously influential The Ages of
American Law3 and to the Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”)
movement,4 to make vast overstatements about what judges
who worked during the “classical era” believed and how
committed they were to the beliefs they held.5 The prevailing
historical narrative of doctrinal development and judges’ role
in it presents a straight, progressive line of change from the
foolish innocence of legal formalism to the wise experience of
legal realism and realism’s aftermath.6 Tamanaha argues
there was no such thing as “formalism,” the view that law is
autonomous, comprehensive, logically ordered, and
determinate, with judges applying that law mechanically to

2. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE
(2010).
3. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
4. A footnote on the relationship between legal realism and CLS could either
be very long or mercifully brief. I choose the latter path. Duxbury’s description of
CLS’s early days and its roots in various realist traditions and debates seems as
good as any. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 435-50
(1995).
5. See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 17-21, 60-62.
6. See id. at 1-3.
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the dispute before them.7 Realists and their later
interlocutors—arguing in their strongest statements that the
law is indeterminate, filled with gaps, exceptions, and
contradictions, applied by judges who decide cases based on
intuition, ideology, or personal preference—overstate their
departure from the past as they sought to distinguish
themselves.8 The traditional narrative of discontinuity and
transformation is unsound and unsupportable.9 Legal
theories and approaches to the study of judicial behavior
based upon it merely repeat the error.
Tamanaha offers in its stead a tale of functional
continuity in common law judging under the rubric “balanced
realism.”10 Judges decide easy cases by the nearly mechanical
application of existing rules and harder cases through a more
complex process that considers the standards of the
community.11 In their institutional roles, judges therefore
balance the two approaches of formalism and realism—
hence, “balanced” realism.12 Tamanaha provides an
impressive and, at times, overwhelming inventory of judicial
commentaries made during the “classical” or “formalist” era
that recognize the gaps, uncertainties, and evolving nature
of the common law and judges’ active role in making it.13 The
approach that emerges from these general statements about
the judicial process proves far more complex than the term
“mechanical jurisprudence” that Roscoe Pound attributed to
the era and that continues to be oft-repeated today.14 At the
same time, however, he substitutes the reduction he has
found with another one: reducing a century’s jurisprudence
into the platitudes espoused by judges’ platitudinous
statements about what they do in the abstract. The neat
7. Id. at 14-63.
8. See id. at 67-108.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 6-7.
11. See id. at 186-96.
12. See id. at 125-41, 197-99.
13. Id. at 28-51.
14. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
605 (1908).
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package of formalism becomes the equally neat, if more
palatable, package of balanced realism.
My purpose in this Part is not to argue that Tamanaha
is “wrong,” though, as with most clean and streamlined
historical arguments, he gets some particulars incorrect or
describes them incompletely, and he creates straw figures
that he can easily tear apart. Reviews and mentions of his
book attempt to separate the good from bad and the accurate
from the overstated, and interested readers should consult
them rather than this Paper for fuller consideration of his
argument’s merits, especially for contemporary legal
theory.15 Nor am I concerned that the balanced realism he
promotes is at so abstract a level of generality to be
thoroughly banal—even though it surely is, as Brian Leiter
argues.16 I want instead to probe the narrative structure of
Tamanaha’s history, to see how it fits into certain kinds of
academic and professional arguments that pervade the legal
literature and what it might tell us about the value, if there
is any, of legal intellectual history.17
Indeed, if stated without the trappings of a legal brief
and polemics, Tamanaha’s history is largely correct. Of
course realism’s theory of law and judging did not emerge
fully grown from nothing in the early twentieth century; of
course a common law system produced cases and
commentary that resist the stultification and implications of
an excessively static, formal system of law. As Al Brophy has
explained in his review of the book, Tamanaha was not the
first to note this.18 Over the past several decades, intellectual
15. Compare Alfred L. Brophy, Did Formalism Never Exist?, 92 TEX. L. REV.
383 (2013) (reviewing and challenging Tamanaha’s book for its historical
account), and Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the
Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010) (questioning aspects of the book’s historical
narrative and challenging its substantive jurisprudential theory), with Edward
Rubin, The Real Formalists, the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us About
Judicial Decision Making and Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 (2011)
(articulating a much more positive review of the book).
16. See Leiter, supra note 15, at 125-27.
17. On the role of narrative in history, see HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1973); HAYDEN
WHITE, TROPICS OF DISCOURSE (1978).
18. See Brophy, supra note 15, at 388.
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historians have added nuance to the picture that legal
theorists and some legal historians have offered of
“formalists.”19 But Tamanaha provides a useful and pointed
rejoinder to legal theorists and jurisprudes that the simple
narrative of the “Classical Era Before Realism” is in fact more
complex than a bunch of silly men in robes expounding on the
wonders and beauty of legal rules.20 Of course, as he notes,
the academics denominated as “realists” constituted
themselves as distinct from previous generations and
contemporaries by establishing the narrative in the first
place.21
The question of why they did so does not appear to
interest Tamanaha. When he confronts the question of who
and what these people were, he vacillates. Sometimes he
acknowledges some thin notion that they “shared [a]
skeptical take on the role of law in judging”;22 he makes
statements
and
repeats
arguments
from
others
23
acknowledging diversity among the realists; and he even
suggests that “realism” might have sprung whole cloth from
private correspondence between Llewellyn and Pound, and
never emerged except in their imaginations.24 He also
considers who the realists themselves were, though not in
great detail.25 There were no card-carrying members or
official meetings; their membership was contested, and some
who clearly espoused “realist” ideas (like Leon Green)
pointedly refused the label.26 Their interests and
19. See, e.g., KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON LAW, HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1790–1900: LEGAL THOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM (2011); DAVID M.
RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN
TO HISTORY (2013); Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Legal
Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431.
20. See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 28-51.
21. Id. at 17-18 (noting that Llewellyn and Pound, as well as Gilmore,
established the narrative).
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 69-71.
25. See id. at 71-74.
26. Id. at 69. The full story of Pound and Llewellyn’s correspondence reveals
the essentially random quality of the exercise. See N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND
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methodologies varied, and while a core of them were in the
early-middle of their academic career and approximately the
same age during realism’s heyday, they were as diverse in
personality and temperament as one might expect of such a
non-diverse group of white, male law faculty.27 Tamanaha
fails to offer a solution to the mystery of why the narrative
began in the 1930s, rather than the 1970s, and barely
considers the possibility. Instead, the “what” question is his
focus—what the realists and their later interlocutors said
that contributed to the received narrative, and what the socalled “formalist” judges said that undercuts it.
To distill from this tendentious and contingent
assemblage of ideas, methods, and human beings a narrow
theory of adjudication, as Tamanaha (and the many other
contemporaries to whom he is responding) does, is to perform
the same historical transformation that he rightly critiques
regarding “formalism” and “formalists.” Those associated
with realism undertook their research and writing outside of
Llewellyn’s mind and correspondence. They may have
espoused similar ideas about, among other things, the role of
judges, law’s politics, and law’s political consequences, but
they did so to differing degrees and in different voices, while
focusing on different doctrinal areas and asking different
research questions. They also worked in different law schools
scattered around the country (or, in Jerome Frank and Felix
Cohen’s cases, in non-academic settings),28 and therefore
within distinct intellectual communities, institutional
pressures, and opportunities. To transform this group into a
“movement” requires some degree of imagination; to reduce
it to a few PowerPoint slides is to conjure an efficient theory
out of a small sample of publications from a motley group of
KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING
(1997).
AND

FOR AN

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 173-222

27. A brief account both of the coherent story of “legal realism” and of its
undermining in the actual history of institutions, events, and personalities,
appears in JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE 15-21 (1995).
28. On Frank’s career, see ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985); on Cohen’s career,
see DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE
FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL PLURALISM (2007).
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individuals who were plenty busy doing other things, and
then to claim that they all agreed with the simplification.
The Sturm und Drang of that era begs for some
explanation besides the arrogance or anxieties of a new
generation of legal academics. If historical actors think they
are engaged in an important intellectual project to overthrow
an existing regime—and some of them at least clearly did—
they were not simply fudging the historical record when
claiming they were correcting the mistakes of their
predecessors. We should not take them at their word as if
they are fair and objective historians; but nor should we
assume they are fantasists creating myth out of whole cloth.
They established a narrative about themselves, their
forebears, and doctrinal development, and as with any
scholarly claims—including Tamanaha’s—they produced
that narrative in a particular institutional and political
context. That narrative’s survival and ongoing salience, too,
requires some consideration, as its success can no longer be
the direct result of CLS’s rise and Gilmore’s bewitching
prose, if in fact it ever was. The continuing predominance of
the narrative is a fascinating mystery, but solving it would
require a degree of nuance, sympathy, and symptomatic
reading, as well as research into the primary sources that
reveal institutional and personal history. It would require
the hard work and thought of intellectual history that do not
seem to interest Tamanaha.
That those associated with realism presented an overly
simplistic historical argument in their own platitudinous
statements is no reason to believe what they said, to believe
that they believed it, or to believe that their successors
continue to believe it rather than merely repeat it
unthinkingly as gospel. The predominant discontinuity
narrative is at once a powerfully convenient story—powerful
in its ability to distinguish between approaches, convenient
in its ability to combine signifiers—and an historically
reductive one. But so is Tamanaha’s continuity narrative. In
place of the realists’ and their supporters’ vision of
intellectual struggle (as opposed to an unspoken or not quite
as voluble, actual political, generational, and institutional
one), Tamanaha’s several parades of straw men dramatize an
overriding genius-of-a-system common law tradition, one
that can bear and incorporate intellectual struggles within
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its capacious judicial process. Such parades are wonderful
and useful, and they have sustained generations of
intellectual debate among lawyers and legal academics. They
continue to make teaching legal doctrine easier and more fun.
They aid brief-writing and give the illusion of important
stakes in otherwise sterile academic debates. They can even
be called a kind of historical inquiry—after all, they
demonstrate an interest in the past, and thank goodness for
that. They can constitute a history of ideas and intellectual
history of a thin sort. But they are neither careful, mindful of
ambiguity, open to self-reflection and self-critique, interested
in the complexity of institutions and individual biography,
nor willing to seek out and confront contradictory sources.
They are to history what philosophical debates among
lawyers are to philosophy.29
II.“REALISM,” REALISTS, AND REALISM’S MYTHMAKING:
THE CASE OF THURMAN ARNOLD
WABAC machine to 1930 or so. Thurman Arnold, whom
Tamanaha lists as a prominent realist,30 arrived at Yale from
the outer province of West Virginia (where he served as dean
for a couple of years).31 He was hired first as a visiting
professor to take part in Dean Charles Clark’s efforts to study
the Connecticut courts.32 Arnold was not a typical legal
realist, however.33 His tenure in the academy lasted less than
a decade, and he rarely engaged in scholarly debates after he
left.34 His prominent later professional career—as assistant
attorney general in charge of antitrust enforcement, federal
appellate judge, and then co-founder of a prominent D.C. law
29. Alas, self-issued licenses to practice history are cheaper than self-issued
licenses to practice philosophy, which is a reflection of philosophers’ more
successful and intensive efforts to police their discipline through obscure jargon
and method.
30. See TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 94.
31. SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 39-44 (2005).
32. Id. at 43-44.
33. As if such a thing existed, stuffed and set in a diorama on the Yale campus.
34. The exception is an important one: Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart’s
Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298 (1960).
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firm—overshadows his brief academic one.35 But he was an
important figure at Yale when that school housed a large and
prominent number of those associated with realism.36 And in
cycling through the gamut of realist methodologies and
perspectives, from quantitative empirics through doctrinal
critique and legal theory, Arnold’s work both confounds and
replicates Tamanaha’s historical narrative. His was a far
more varied and polyglot “realism” that anticipated the
intellectual moves of succeeding generations, even if it did
not directly inform them. Like several other realists, his
interest lay in questions besides judicial decision-making and
legal form.37
Nevertheless, Arnold imagined himself setting both the
law and academic debate right, offering his arguments (and
those of his compatriots) as the end of a fairly simplified
historical progression of ideas. His storytelling thus
resembles Tamanaha’s own mythmaking, as it does that of
the endless parade of legal academics who invoke their
historical forebears. To illustrate his work and considerable
narrative abilities, I briefly summarize below Arnold’s work
on criminal law and procedure, fields that were not at the
core of what Tamanaha identifies as realism’s concerns.
Arnold applied realist methods to reach distinct conclusions
about the way forward for legal theory and reform.
* * *
Reporting on the empirical study on the criminal docket
in the Connecticut federal courts he was engaged in with
Dean Clark and the newly arrived William Douglas,38 Arnold
35. See generally WALLER, supra note 31, at 78-180.
36. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 137-43 (1986);
Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the
New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 75, 85-87 (Anthony T.
Kronman ed., 2004).
37. I have extensively discussed Arnold’s work elsewhere. See generally Mark
Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the Making of
Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69 (2005); Mark Fenster, The
Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Theory, 51 BUFF.
L. REV. 1053 (2003).
38. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 27, at 86-88.
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published a “progress report” in a 1931 issue of the A.B.A.
Journal in which he used realist terms that emphasized its
study of the “law in action,”39 while it rejected the formalist
study of the “formation of principles.”40 Having obtained
“mass statistics” of the actual procedures that courts used,
the study found courts engaged in an “almost too efficient”
process of overseeing plea bargains for prosecutions for the
production, sale, and possession of alcohol under the federal
Volstead Act.41 Like similar studies undertaken around the
same time, Arnold and his collaborators had discovered the
emergence of the modern system of criminal justice—the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion to avoid criminal trials.42
Tamanaha and others marginalize the empirical strain of
realism as strange and naïve, if they recall it at all. But it
was in fact more important than jurisprudential realism to
many of those identified with realism in the late 1920s and
early 1930s, as well as to the deans at Yale and Harvard,43
and it foreshadowed the academy’s current fixation with
quantitative methodology as well as the longer-lived “law and
society” interest in the close study of law in action.44
Empirical work was ultimately not to Arnold’s liking,
however, and he soon abandoned it for the speculative
pursuits of doctrinal critique and his own brand of antijurisprudential jurisprudence. And so, even before the
completion of the Connecticut study, Arnold turned to
substantive criminal law in an article titled Criminal
39. Thurman W. Arnold, Progress Report on the Study of the Federal Courts—
No. 7, 17 A.B.A. J. 799, 799 (1931).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 800, 801.
42. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 27, at 89.
43. While Dean Clark had recruited Arnold to Yale specifically because of the
latter’s empirical work on West Virginia courts, Dean Roscoe Pound was
attempting to woo Arnold to Harvard on the same basis—to join an empirical
project he was sponsoring. See Letter from Thurman Arnold to Roscoe Pound
(Jan. 23, 1931), in VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD
176-77 (Gene M. Gressley ed., 1977).
44. That the realists’ empirical methods are now viewed as primitive says as
much about evolving, contingent means of unearthing truth through the
collection of data and the numerical representation of that data as it does about
the realists’ methodology.
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Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction,45 where he
critiqued the case law and scholarship that attempted to
explain and systematize a notoriously complicated and
incoherent area of law.46 He attacked in particular the
“formalist” Joseph Beale and the eminent criminal law
scholar Francis Sayre, both of Harvard, who sought in
different ways to construct a stable, mechanically applicable
criminal attempts doctrine by categorizing culpable attempts
and distinguishing the mens rea of inchoate acts and the
theoretical consequences of non-actions.47 Beale and Sayre
were not alone; a number of learned scholars had more
recently sought to tame the doctrine through fine distinctions
and categories.48
To Arnold, all of these distinct but similar approaches led
only to the rise of the “abstraction” to which the article’s title
referred. They made little sense in theory and proved
impossible to apply, and taken together they were part of a
tendency towards “analytical thinking” and “search for
abstractions” which had confused scholars and jurists for
generations.49 Scholars and appellate courts could not make
sense of the doctrine because its very principle made no sense

45. See Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an
Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930).
46. Id.
47. See id.; see also J. H. Beale, Jr., Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REV. 491,
491-92 (1903) (identifying four elements of the attempt crime: an act, the intent
to “adapt[ ]” that step towards a purpose to complete the offense, nearness of
success, and failure); Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV.
821, 837-39 (1928) (consolidating Beale’s four elements into three: act, intent, and
consequences, with intent playing the dominant role and the consequences of an
attempt the least significant one).
48. See, e.g., John W. Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts, Part II,
19 GEO. L.J. 316, 337 (1931) (arguing that that an attempt merited criminal
punishment to the extent that it breached the peace and thereby challenged and
harmed the state’s authority); John S. Strahorn, Jr., The Effect of Impossibility
on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 971 (1930) (arguing that the law of
criminal attempt should focus not on act and intent but on the question of whether
an attempt creates “a substantial impairment of some interest protected by the
involved prohibitions against the crime or its related attempt”).
49. Arnold, supra note 45, at 59-60.
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and had no boundaries.50 Indeed, Arnold argued, the absence
of reported cases that consider the law of attempt, and the
vanishingly small number of decisions that had relied on
attempt as a standalone doctrine in the very recent past,
proved that attempt was a largely meaningless abstraction.51
The current scholarly controversy over how to classify and
apply the attempt doctrine, therefore, failed to reckon with
the fact that courts largely ignored the doctrine and the
debate it had engendered.
Arnold offered a functional alternative that he claimed
was based on the work of judges who smartly adapted the law
to particular cases in order to arrive at fair and administrable
conclusions.52 They did so by suppressing the desire for a
separate law of attempt and by focusing instead on the
relationship between the alleged action in the particular case
and the underlying substantive crime that the defendant
allegedly failed to complete, using new attempt statutes to
“throw all [the conceptual] machinery overboard.”53 Attempt
to murder should be viewed and evaluated within the ambit
of the statutory prohibition against murder, attempt to
commit forgery should be evaluated under the forgery
statute, and so on.54 Understood this way, the criminal
attempt doctrine constituted a gap-filling device that would
allow courts to punish criminally culpable conduct not
included within a statute’s specific language and not serious
enough to warrant the full penalty for violating statute.55
This looks like standard realist stuff, at least in
Tamanaha’s reconstruction of realism’s rhetoric. While
Arnold never used the word “formalism” and only once used
the word “realistic” (in the context of praising trial courts for
undertaking a “more realistic treatment”),56 he might have
employed those labels, or at least concepts, more freely if the
50. Id. at 63-64, 68-70.
51. See id. at 78-79.
52. See id. at 78.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 77-78.
55. See id. at 75-76.
56. See id. at 79.
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article had been published one or two years later. Arnold
aimed his criticism at the tendencies of commentators and
appellate courts “to qualify and analyze the useless
abstractions until they obtain at least an appearance of
certainty.”57 He continued:
They do not like to admit frankly that some situations where
predictability is impossible can be handled more intelligently with
less logical machinery, rather than with more, because the presence
of an elaborate set of principles adds an additional and unnecessary
element of uncertainty by diverting the court’s mind from the real
question to the rules.58

He fought a seemingly unseen enemy whose transgressions
were defined by an ideal of mechanical jurisprudence,
perpetrated most egregiously by scholarly efforts to tame a
doctrine that need barely exist at all.
The true villain of the piece, however, was not a diffuse
“formalism” but a particular approach to a specific set of
arguments made by prominent legal academics and
published in leading law reviews. Although implicitly part of
a broader theoretical and jurisprudential critique of some
broader phenomenon, Arnold’s was not a scattershot attack
on an amorphous school of judging or thought. It was a
narrow, technical unveiling of a vapid way of handling what
he viewed as a silly doctrine. Arnold did not see himself as
Tamanaha portrayed him and his peers—a would-be young
turk allied with others who built a movement by fabricating
an enemy who largely did not exist. To the extent that Arnold
was a realist, he viewed himself on an actual battlefield
engaged with real competition, among them the nefarious
Beale.59

57. Id. at 80.
58. Id.
59. For examples of the rhetoric surrounding Beale, see JEROME FRANK, LAW
MODERN MIND 53-61 (1931) (discussing Beale as “representative of the
conventional doctrine” of “legal fundamentalism”); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
833 (1935) (sarcastically listing Beale as one of the leading “classical jurists” and
“masters of the law”); Walter B. Kennedy, Functional Nonsense and the
Transcendental Approach, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 272, 282 n.63 (1936)
AND THE
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* * *
The Criminal Attempts article merely marked a middle
position for Arnold. His next article on criminal law,
published two years later, critiqued the very functionalism
which the legal realists seemed to uphold. In Law
Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection, Arnold
sought to explain why scholars seemed unable to persuade
courts and legislatures to adopt their great ideas.60 Its
primary motivation was not to criticize any particular ideas
for their abstraction, but to explain to reformers the
assumptions under which courts and legislatures work.61
They wrongly assumed that the criminal justice system was
rational and functional. The substantive criminal law, he
argued, is an “elaborate . . . attempt to reconcile and make
more definite the implications of the vague public ideals that
surround the criminal courts.”62 The resulting criminal code
crams together an excessive and incoherent array of crimes
in an effort to further contradictory and incoherent moral and
cultural ideas.63 The public expects that the enforcement of
these laws will be strict, mechanical, and impartial, at least
when the prohibitions are enacted.64 Utilizing the insights
gleaned from his early empirical work, Arnold explained that
the public does not get what it wants and assumes is
occurring. Prosecutors utilize their discretion and the
relative invisibility of their work in most cases to decide not
to prosecute everyone who violates a crime, because doing so
would merely “clog the machinery” of justice “with relentless
prosecution of comparatively harmless persons.”65 When they
do prosecute, they rely heavily on plea bargains, all in an
effort to best allocate their limited resources in a manner that
(characterizing Beale as “the arch-disciple of conceptualistic dogma, say the
realists,” in an extended, vitriolic critique of realism).
60. Thurman W. Arnold, Law Enforcement—An Attempt at Social Dissection,
42 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1932).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 7.
63. Id. at 7, 14-15.
64. See id. at 6-7, 11.
65. Id. at 9.
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can still protect the public from the worst and most
dangerous criminals.66 As a consequence, quibbles over
doctrine and efforts to establish logical categories of
criminally culpable behavior will fail.67 The action and power
in criminal law reside in a largely lawless, purely
discretionary system of law enforcement.68
Arnold’s argument appears to be a realist description of
a failed formalist system. Rather than offer a transformative
vision or technical reform to improve the system, he took his
realist insights in a different direction. The ideal of
mechanically-applicable criminal laws founded in moral and
cultural principle, he argued, sits at the core of the criminal
justice system and will not be displaced by calls for more
realistic reforms.69 Campaigns to reform must operate within
the ideal of strict, morally righteous law enforcement—a
necessary fiction that reformers must use “to accomplish the
desired ends.”70 The jurisprudence of criminal law (and of law
generally) is a symptom rather than an explanation, part of
a range of ideas that “people cling to as social values, and the
kind of phrases to which they respond.”71 Though untrue, the
ideals of law enforcement constitute the “personality” of the
criminal justice system and establish its security by making
it legitimate to “that part of the public whose acceptance is
vital to [its] power . . . , and without which it fails.”72
By this point in his intellectual trajectory, Arnold had
departed from what is now considered the mainstream of
legal realism in two respects. His writing no longer
confidently suggested even the barest of programmatic
normative outlines. The intuitive wisdom of the trial courts
offered no significant relief; indeed, in his first monograph
The Symbols of Government, his characterization of the
criminal trial was wholly descriptive, critiquing and
66. Id. at 17-18.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 12-14.
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. at 23-24.
72. Id. at 23.
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satirizing all components of the adjudicative part of the
criminal justice system, including the attorneys, judge, and
jury, without providing barely a whiff of a solution.73 All that
the purely symbolic trial accomplishes is to present criminal
justice as a procedural drama, one in which procedure itself
stands as a “great humanitarian ideal”74—even as it
frequently subverts the pursuit of substantive justice. At the
same time, the level of abstraction in his work ascended far
beyond the technical, doctrinal issue that Criminal Attempts
considered, and well beyond the formalist-realist divide in
doctrinal debates. Instead, his concern was primarily
sociological and anthropological, foreshadowing the New
Left’s cultural and social critiques to come, but without their
invocation of a radical, transformative political movement.
Lacking a normative answer and the faith that any
functional solutions would either win out politically or solve
the problems they addressed, Arnold had moved beyond the
realists’ progressive narrative to a kind of tragicomic eternal
return of symbolic arguments over form and function.
* * *
Perhaps the outlying nature of Arnold’s work, and his
departures from what we view now as the realist norm, make
him largely irrelevant to all but intellectual historians. From
our present view, the “realism” of Thurman Arnold (and of
the other outliers, including Underhill Moore’s parking lot
study, Llewellyn’s interest in legal anthropology, etc.) has
simply disappeared in the Darwinian rush of legal theory and
jurisprudence. In Tamanaha’s narrative, we have moved
towards a narrower understanding and use of “legal realism”
and “formalism” to assist us in far more important tasks, like
developing a contemporary jurisprudence, an analytical
theory of law, or a theory of judicial behavior. He would
shrink those categories further, dispensing with them in
favor of a balanced realism. We can read Arnold out of this
legal history because the subject is only useful to the extent
that it serves present concerns and debates. Any stray details
73. THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 128-48 (1935).
74. See id. at 143.
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about marginal historical figures, complicating institutional
histories, or intellectual trajectories can appear in the
marginal publications of those few who live in the dusky
twilight thrown off by old bound copies of law reviews (or,
more likely, the outer reaches of HeinOnline) or, worse, the
dusty shelves of general university libraries.
Ironically, of course, the approach that renders Arnold
superfluous to the realist narrative and to Tamanaha’s
rejection of that narrative was one of Arnold’s own signature
moves. He cared little about history too, except insofar as it
might confirm or be useful for the present purpose of an
argument he was making. He used the trial of Joan of Arc,
which received renewed interest during the early 1930s, in
his discussion of the criminal trial only because it was a
wonderfully symbolic event, illustrating (at least as Arnold
recounted it) precisely the argument he wanted to make
about the empty rituals of criminal procedure.75 Having left
behind the specific debates of criminal attempt, he had no
need to actually support his quite broad claims about
conceptualists who fetishized abstract legal forms and
reformers who wanted to ignore and sweep away all of the
outdated doctrine that stood in modernity’s way. He
presented his own parade of the usable past.
Unfortunately for Arnold’s reputation, the current,
accepted version of this parade cares very little for his sort.
Felix Cohen’s Transcendental Nonsense,76 Karl Llewellyn’s
work on the UCC,77 and Jerome Frank’s Law and the Modern
Mind78 are among the small number of canonical works that
best represent what contemporary scholars want from
Realism, perhaps alongside Holmes’s The Path of the Law79
and Cardozo’s The Nature of the Judicial Process,80 old
75. Id. at 135-41. The transcript of Joan of Arc’s trial had recently appeared in
an English translation. See THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D’ARC 1-2, 17-18 (G. G. Coulton
& Eileen Power eds., W. P. Barrett trans., 1931).
76. Cohen, supra note 59.
77. Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325
(1995).
78. FRANK, supra note 59.
79. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
80. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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chestnuts from those considered either predecessors or protorealists. These writings are included in course syllabi and
name-dropped in faculty workshops, their ideals distilled to
a particular analytical essence and their sources cited in law
review footnotes when an editor requires support. More
likely, recent and more probing secondary sources provide a
summary means to invoke the parade float that realism—
and formalism, for that matter—have become. And Thurman
Arnold, part of the original parade and himself one of the
era’s better carnys, barely gets a mention. Rightly so, given
the current parade’s interests and purposes. This is what
Tamanaha both critiques and perpetuates, refiguring the
characters in his own jurisprudential parade of the past.
CONCLUSION
At the end of each Mr. Peabody episode, after the title
character has gotten the last laugh with a terrible pun and
the animation has faded to black, the transition to the rest of
the show ran in this way:
Panning across the busts of famous but unnamed white men from
various historical eras, the camera finds a live, anonymous looking
man with a moustache, standing in a garbage can that resembles
somewhat the pedestals on which the busts sit. It is the same street
sweeper from the parade. Upon that recognition, he moves his face
to wag his moustache, changes from his white uniform hat to a
black bowler, grabs his umbrella, wags his moustache at us again
in a kind of humorous salute, and then runs out—but not before
reaching back with an absurdly long arm to flip a blank sign over
so that it reads, “THE END.”

The street sweeper is anonymous—a humble, unnoticed
figure. He follows the great men, sweeping their detritus with
a sense of purpose and humor. Taking a minimal evaluative
perspective among self-proclaimed heavyweights of history
and their self-important evaluator in Mr. Peabody—perhaps
beyond noticing who is leaving the most refuse—the sweeper
is empowered to note the parade’s end, but even then does so
almost as an afterthought.
Like the street sweeper, intellectual historians are not at
the center of the legal parade, nor are they part of it in the
way of traditional legal academics pronouncing on history
from the perspective of the present and as part of a presently
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relevant argument. We are marginal to the enterprise. Law
is aware of and concerned with—indeed at times obsessed
with—its history. But its understanding of its history, and
especially of the role of ideas in that history, is ever in the
service of some other project. At its best, intellectual history
can clean that up. It does so unnoticed, after the parade has
moved on.

